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In June 2011, a Chicago jury convicted former Illinois Governor 
Rod Blagojevich of seventeen counts of public corruption.1 
Blagojevich was sentenced to fourteen years, and Illinois residents will 
now watch their fourth governor serve time in prison on corruption 
charges.2 While misconduct by government officials is neither a recent 
development nor exclusive to Illinois, the much-publicized criminal 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2005, University of Colorado at Boulder. Special thanks to Bill 
Gray for his valuable insight. 
1 Dan Rushe, Rod Blagojevich, Former Illinois Governor, Found Guilty of 
Corruption, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world 
/2011/jun/27/rod-blagojevich-barack-obama-senate-seat. 
2 Former Illinois Governors Otto Kerner, Dan Walker, and George Ryan have 
also served jail time on public corruption charges. ‘Sorry’ Blagojevich Gets 14-Year 
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and civil trials of former governor Blagojevich have provided fodder 
for proponents of governmental reform.3  
Legislative immunity ensures that government officials are 
shielded from civil liability for any conduct within the “sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity,”4 and its availability to government 
officials has long been a staple of our legal system.5 Though perhaps 
unpopular among members of the general public, the rationale behind 
its protection is relatively straightforward: Fear of civil liability cannot 
be allowed to inhibit legislative action and stymie the democratic 
process.6  
To afford such expansive protection necessarily involves a 
balancing of interests: the public’s need for unencumbered legislative 
action; and the ability of individual citizens to seek redress for 
egregious, and often criminal abuses of power.7 Critics of legislative 
immunity consider it nothing more than a get-out-of-jail free card for 
corrupt politicians,8 a greater evil than that which it was meant to 
avert. Nevertheless, legislative immunity has withstood judicial 
scrutiny since before the Revolution, and the courts have deemed 
traditional deterrents—voter disapproval, impeachment, and potential 
criminal liability—sufficient safeguards against governmental 
impropriety.9 
                                                 
3 Adriana Colindres, Illinois Reform Panel’s 1st Topic: Open Gov’t, THE STATE 
JOURNAL-REGISTER (Feb. 23, 2009, 12:11 AM), http://www.sj-
r.com/news/x863266035/First-topic-for-Illinois-reform-panel-open-government. 
4 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). 
5  Id. at 372. 
6 Id. at 373–74; Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998) (stating that “the 
exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or 
distorted by the fear of personal liability.”). 
7 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see Lake Country Estates, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405–06 (1979). 
8 This is meant only in the colloquial sense. The common law privilege of 
legislative immunity does not shield government officials from criminal liability, 
even for acts related to legislative duties. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 
627 (1972) (concluding that the judicially fashioned privilege cannot go so far as to 
immunize criminal conduct proscribed by and Act of Congress). 
9 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
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In Empress Casino v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed, 
and arguably strengthened, the legislative immunity doctrine as it 
pertains to state officials.10 In dismissing the federal RICO-conspiracy 
charges against former Governor Blagojevich, the court prompted a 
reexamination of the doctrine’s applicability to state officials; 
specifically, whether a state legislative immunity doctrine that affords 
lesser protection than federal law can be given controlling effect for 
federal claims brought against State officials.11 In holding that federal 
legislative immunity should apply,12 the Seventh Circuit was forced to 
maneuver the myriad of political and constitutional concerns that 
inevitably pervade any discussion of legislative immunity.13  
Part I of this comment will provide an historical overview of the 
Speech or Debate Clause and the common law privilege of legislative 
immunity. Part II of this comment will examine the Supreme Court’s 
functional approach to federal legislative immunity, and its application 
to government officials in various contexts. Part III of this comment 
will discuss the sources of legislative immunity in Illinois, including 
the Illinois Constitution and the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich. Part IV of this comment will 
provide an overview of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Express 
Casino v. Blagojevich, as well as Judge Posner’s dissent. Part V of this 
comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit was correct in allowing 
former Governor Blagojevich to invoke federal legislative immunity 
as a defense to the federal RICO claim against him, and further argue 
that the application of state-law immunity as a defense to federal 
claims would be inappropriate as a matter of law and policy.  
 
                                                 
10 See Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 532 (7th Cir. 
2011), vacated on other grounds sub nom Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral 
Racing Club, Inc., 649 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2011). 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 The Supreme Court alluded to the constitutional taproots of legislative 
immunity for state legislators in Tenney v. Brandhove, stating: “let us assume, 
merely for the moment, that Congress has constitutional power to limit the freedom 
of State legislators acting within their traditional sphere. That would be a big 
assumption.” 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE & FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. 
 
The historical development and policy considerations underlying 
the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the common 
law privilege of legislative immunity overlap considerably,14 and 
while the two remain distinct privileges, the preservation of legislative 
independence is paramount to both.15 However, legislative immunity 
is a judicial creation meant to extend the protections of the Speech or 
Debate Clause to state government officials and the Executive and 
Judicial branches of government.16 An historical analysis of both must 
preface any discussion of legislative immunity and its relevance in the 
modern political arena. 
 
A. The Speech or Debate Clause 
 
The Speech or Debate Clause represents the culmination of 
British and Colonial efforts to establish and maintain an independent 
legislature.17 Though its text affords immense protection, the Founders 
exercised deliberate and conspicuous restraint: 
 
[The Senators and Representatives]…shall in all Cases, 
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be 
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session 
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from 
                                                 
14 Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) 
(“we have [] recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from 
liability for their legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale 
to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause.”). 
15 See id. at 733. 
16 Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 1992). 
17 Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 372. At the outset, it is important to note that 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity concerns the liability of the state itself for 
the actions of its governmental officials, rather than the personal liability of the 
actor. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 128 (1908). 
68 
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the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.18  
 
The inclusion of the Clause in the U.S. Constitution can be traced to 
the English Parliament of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.19 
As the Parliament asserted its independence from the Crown, its 
members became increasingly adamant in demanding an uninhibited 
legislature, free from prosecutorial intimidation or condemnation.20 In 
1698, that vision was eventually realized, and the English Bill of 
Rights was amended to provide: “[t]hat the Freedom of Speech, and 
Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.”21  
At the time of the American Constitutional Convention, the 
Framers viewed the inclusion of a similar provision in the U.S. 
Constitution as fundamental to the system of checks and balances.22 
Oft mentioned are the two principles on which the Clause rests: the 
prevention of Executive or Judicial intrusion into the affairs of the 
Legislature, and the preservation of legislative independence.23 Aptly 
characterized by James Wilson, a member of the Committee of Detail 
responsible for the provision in the Federal Constitution, were the 
benefits of what would eventually become the Speech or Debate 
Clause:  
 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the 
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, 
it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest 
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the 
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the 
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.24    
                                                 
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, Cl. 1. 
19 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). 
20 Id. at 372. 
21 Id. (citation omitted). 
22 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369–70 (1980). 
23 Id.; see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). 
24 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 786. 
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However, opponents of the Clause admonished the dangers of 
granting—as they saw it—a constitutional right to corruption.25  
The narrow construction of the Clause reflects the principal evil 
that the Founders sought to avert: the undue infringement of the 
Legislature by the Executive branch.26 In several infamous cases, 
Members of Parliament were prosecuted for publicly challenging the 
authority of the crown, and the Clause was born primarily to prevent 
similar acts of intimidation by the Executive branch.27 Thus, the clause 
was drafted narrowly to confine the privilege to that purpose. It 
extends only to Members of the U.S. Congress, for speech made in 
either House, and does not extend to state legislators, administrative 
officials, the judiciary, or any other government employee who 
participates in the legislative process.28 
Given the Founders’ predominant concern with preserving the 
Separation of Powers—i.e. the prevention of Executive 
                                                 
25 The passage of the parliamentary privilege was immediately followed by the 
abuse of the privilege by members of Parliament. Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and 
Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973) [hereinafter Legislative 
Immunity]. As the privilege was extended to the servants of the parliamentary 
members, the privilege was often sold on the open market. Id. However, the most 
egregious abuses were eliminated by an act of 1770 stripping servants of the 
privilege. Id. 
26 United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979) (“The Speech or Debate 
Clause was designed neither to assure fair trials nor to avoid coercion. Rather, its 
purpose was to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal branches of 
government.”). 
27 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 371 (“In 1668, after a long and bitter struggle, 
Parliament finally laid the ghost of Charles I, who had prosecuted Sir John Elliot and 
others for ‘seditious’ speeches in Parliament.”); Legislative Immunity, supra note 26, 
at 26 (“during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, members of the House of Commons 
who attempted to discuss matters in Parliament distasteful to the crown often found 
themselves confined to the Tower of London.”). 
28 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (concluding that for 
the Speech or Debate Clause to reach matters outside either house, they must be an 
integral part of the communicative process in either House). Advisors and aides to 
Legislators are protected by the Constitutional privilege under certain circumstances, 
as they are deemed essential to the legislative process and an extension of the 
Legislators themselves. Id. at 618. 
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infringement—the Supreme Court has recognized that the Clause was 
meant primarily to preclude criminal, as opposed to civil liability.29 
However, even for criminal allegations, the Court has allowed judicial 
inquiry into actions performed by a legislator in the normal exercise of 
his office, so long as there exists reason to believe that a crime was 
committed off the floor of Congress. 
 
B. Federal Legislative Immunity 
 
Unlike the Speech or Debate Clause, the principal purpose of 
legislative immunity is to restrict civil, rather than criminal liability.30 
While in many ways an extension of the constitutional privilege, 
legislative immunity is a judicial creation.31 Both the Speech or 
Debate Clause and common law legislative immunity seek primarily 
to preserve the independence of the Legislature, however, the danger 
averted by the common law privilege is not Executive infringement 
via the prosecution of government officials, but rather the public’s 
undue interference with the efficient operations of government.32 The 
burdens of unfettered litigation could distract government officials 
from their duties, inhibit their discretionary activities, and deter able 
citizens from public service.33 
At least in theory, the actual beneficiary of legislative immunity is 
not the government official under attack, but the general public.34 The 
principal purpose of the privilege is not the derivative benefit 
conferred upon the government official, but the preservation of 
inhibited legislative action.35 The immunity that the government 
official receives is actually the cost that society bears as a means to 
                                                 
29 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491. 
30 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372 (1980) (citation omitted) 
(stating that judicially fashioned official immunity does not reach so far as to 
immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an act of Congress). 
31 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 
391, 405 (1979). 
32 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
33 Id. at 816. 
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ensure the efficient operations of government.36 “Legislators are 
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their 
legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public 
good.”37 Accordingly, legislative immunity bars claims seeking both 
monetary and injunctive relief.38 While the fear of injunctive relief is 
unlikely to strike fear in the hearts of government officials as 
monetary damages surely would, incessant claims for injunctive relief 
would nevertheless pose a significant distraction for government 
officials and the courts.39   
The invocation of legislative immunity has arisen primarily within 
the context of federal claims that impose civil liability for the violation 
of an individual’s constitutional rights, such as §1983 and Bivens 
claims.40 However, legislative immunity also protects government 
officials from civil suit for Federal RICO violations, and other statutes 
that impose civil liability for criminal violations.41 Consequently, 
legislative immunity developed primarily within the federal courts as a 
part of federal law, and the states have had scant opportunity to 
develop independent doctrines.42  
 
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
 
A. An Improper Purpose Does Not Destroy the Privilege.   
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of legislative immunity is that 
the privilege is “absolute,” precluding judicial inquiry into the 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. (citation omitted). 
38 Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731–34 
(1980). 
39 Cf. id. at 731–32. 
40 Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 530 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
41 Id. at 529. 
42 See id. at 530. 
72 
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 7, Issue 1                               Fall 2011 
 
subjective motivation of the governmental actor.43 The “claim of an 
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.”44 The Supreme 
Court has recognized absolute immunity for those government 
officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires 
complete protection from suit,45 without regard to the reasonableness 
of their actions.46 Absolute immunity has been recognized for judges 
in their judicial functions, certain high-level executive officials 
including prosecutors and the President, and of course, government 
officials acting in a legislative capacity.47 
As the principal purpose of legislative immunity is to protect 
government officials from frivolous and vexatious civil suits, to allow 
inquiry into the subjective intent of the government actor might erode 
the protection legislative immunity was meant to provide.48 As Justice 
Frankfurter noted in Tenney v. Brandhove, “The privilege would be of 
little value if [government officials] could be subjected to the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the 
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a 
jury’s speculation as to motives.”49 Since the reasonableness of a 
government actor’s intent is a question of fact decided by the courts, 
without absolute immunity, the government official would still bear 
the significant burden of litigating his good intentions.50 
In contrast, qualified or “good faith” immunity is an affirmative 
defense that shields government officials from civil liability for the 
                                                 
43 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (“Whether an act is legislative 
turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official 
performing it.”); see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). 
44 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377. 
45 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
46 Kevin R. Cole, Comment, Civil Rights: A Call for Qualified Legislative 
Immunity for City Council Members under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, 66 WASH. L. REV. 169, 
170 (1991). 
47 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (citation omitted). 
48 Tenney, 341 U.S. at  377. 
49 Id. 
50 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (discussing the burdens associated with the 
subjective element of qualified immunity defenses). 
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performance of discretionary functions.51 It serves as the default 
standard for governmental officials, aside from those officials to 
whom the Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity,52 and does 
not encompass conduct that clearly violates an established statutory or 
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.53 
Qualified immunity operates as a compromise between citizens’ right 
to seek compensation for injuries stemming from governmental 
misconduct, and the need to protect of government officials from 
frivolous litigation and the undue interference with the performance of 
their official duties.54 Unlike absolute immunity, the reasonableness of 
the government official’s actions is often dispositive, and a greater 
number of civil suits survive the summary judgment phase as a 
result.55 
 
B.  The “Sphere of Legitimate Legislative Activity” 
 
In 1951, Tenney v. Brandhove established the “functional 
approach” to legislative immunity in the federal courts.56 Plaintiff 
Brandhove circulated a petition among members of the California 
Legislature alleging that the “Tenney Committee” had helped smear 
the campaign of a San Francisco mayoral candidate, in an attempt to 
dissuade further appropriations to the Committee.57 The Committee 
subsequently conducted hearings, ostensibly to assess the truth of 
these allegations, but Brandhove refused to testify and was thereby 
prosecuted for contempt in state court.58 Brandhove brought a §1983 
action against the individual members of the Committee, alleging that 
the hearing did not serve a “legislative purpose,” but was conducted 
solely to intimidate him and deter the exercise of his constitutional 
                                                 
51 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980). 
52 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
53 Id. at 818. 
54 See generally id. 
55 Cf. id. at 816. 
56 See generally Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
57 Id. at 370. 
58 Id. at 370–71. 
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right to free speech.59 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that state 
legislators are absolutely immune from civil liability under §1983 for 
any conduct performed within the “sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity.”60 In other words, the legislative nature of the conduct, rather 
than the purpose of the conduct or the particular branch of government 
to which the government actor belongs, shall dictate the availability of 
legislative immunity.61  
 
1. Legislative Immunity for State, Local and Regional Officials. 
 
Ample Supreme Court precedent has since reaffirmed legislative 
immunity for state, local, and regional government officials in various 
contexts.62 For example, in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, Plaintiff brought a 
§ 1983 action against the mayor of Fall River, Massachusetts.63 Prior 
to initiating the suit, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the city, 
which accused a subordinate of the mayor of making racially 
inflammatory comments about her colleagues.64 While the charges 
were pending, Mayor Bogan called for the city council to eliminate the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), of which the 
plaintiff was the administrator and sole employee.65 The Plaintiff 
alleged that the elimination of the DHHS was motivated by racial 
animus, and in retaliation for the exercise of her free speech in 
violation of §1983.66 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held 
that local officials are also entitled to legislative immunity because the 
policy rationales behind it apply with equal force at the local level.67 
Justice Thomas further concluded that the Mayor’s conduct was 
                                                 
59 Id. at 371. 
60 Id. 378 
61 Id. 
62 Infra pp. 11–14. 
63 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 47 (1998). 
64 Id. at 46. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 52. (recognizing that the time and energy required to defend against a 
lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-
legislator remains commonplace). 
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“legislative” because it involved a discretionary, policymaking 
decision with prospective implications beyond the plaintiff.68  
The Supreme Court has even extended legislative immunity to 
regional government officials.69 In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, a group of property owners sued the 
individual members of a state compact between California and 
Nevada, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”), alleging 
violations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.70 The agency was responsible for coordinating and 
regulating the development of the Lake Tahoe Basin, a popular resort 
area.71 The plaintiffs alleged that the state compact had adopted land-
use ordinances that destroyed the economic value of their property.72 
Despite the fact that the regional legislators were not elected, and 
therefore unaccountable to the voting public,73 the Supreme Court 
allowed legislative immunity to attach, holding that the federal claims 
did not encompass the recovery of damages from members of a state 
compact acting in a legislative capacity.74 Interestingly, the Court 
alluded to the controlling effect of federal legislative immunity for 
federal claims, asserting that the legislative immunity doctrine 
described in Tenney reflects an interpretation of federal law, 
irrespective of the constitutional or statutory provisions of the 
particular state.75   
 
                                                 
68 Id. at 55–56. 
69 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 
405–06 (1979). 
70 Id. at 393–94. 
71 Id. at 393. 
72 Id. at 394. 
73 Id. at 407 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[N]o member of the board is directly 
accountable to the public for his legislative acts. To cloak these officials with 
absolute protection where control by the electorate is so attenuated subverts the very 
system of checks and balances that the doctrine of legislative privilege was designed 
to secure.”). 
74 Id. at 405. 
75 Id. at 404 (“[A]bsolute immunity for state legislators recognized in Tenney 
reflected the Court’s interpretation of federal law; the decision did not depend on the 
presence of a speech or debate clause in the constitution of any State.”). 
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2. Legislative Immunity Beyond the Legislature: Executive Officials.   
 
An equally well-established feature of the functional approach to 
legislative immunity is that members of all three branches of 
government may avail themselves of the privilege as it relates to their 
legislative duties.76 The availability of legislative immunity to high-
ranking executive officials has proven particularly troublesome, given 
frequent the overlap between legislative and executive duties that 
often arises.77 While high-ranking executive officials are entitled to 
their own form of “executive immunity” for the performance of their 
executive functions,78 executive immunity is typically only qualified 
and offers significantly less protection from suit.79 
For example, in Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court reiterated 
the need to extend immunity to high-ranking federal officials of the 
Executive Branch, but concluded that qualified immunity for high-
ranking executives was sufficient to reconcile the competing values 
involved: the right of citizens to seek damages; and “the need to 
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority.”80 Similarly, Scheuer v. Rhodes involved a § 1983 action 
against the Governor of Ohio for his deployment of the Ohio National 
Guard to Kent State University in 1970.81 The subsequent conflict 
between the students and the National Guard resulted in the deaths of 
                                                 
76 See Tenney, v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 376 (1951); see supra pp. 11–13 
(discussing legislative immunity as applied to local mayors and state compacts). 
77 Cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367–74 (1932) (examining the 
Executive’s role in the legislative process, which includes the signing and vetoing of 
legislation). 
78 The President of the United States is the only “high-ranking” executive 
official to be granted absolute immunity for his executive functions, and the 
Supreme Court has expressly precluded State Governors from invoking absolute 
immunity for executive functions. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) 
abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
79 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
80 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–06 (1978). 
81 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 235. 
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several students.82 The Supreme Court rejected the Governor’s claim 
of absolute executive immunity, holding that the Governor and his 
aides were entitled only to qualified, rather than absolute immunity for 
the exercise of state power.83  
Of course, executive officials are still entitled to absolute 
immunity for the performance of their legislative duties.84 The 
operative distinction is that high-ranking executive officials are 
entitled to legislative immunity for their role in the legislative process, 
but not for conduct taken to implement legislation.85 Though the 
Supreme Court has never squarely addressed a legislative immunity 
claim by a Governor, which the privilege protects the signing or 
vetoing of legislation by a state Governor may be reasonably 
inferred.86 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Governor’s 
signing or vetoing of legislation constitutes a part of the legislative 
process,87 and the Court’s grant of legislative immunity to local 
mayors and regional officials for their legislative duties leaves little 
doubt that State Governors should enjoy the same protection.88 
Furthermore, the Seventh, First, and Eleventh Circuits have held that 




                                                 
82 Id. at 233–34. 
83 Id. at 247–48. 
84 E.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998); see also Bagley v. 
Blagojevich, 646 F.3d 378, 391–98 (2011) (holding that a state Governor’s act of 
signing or vetoing legislation is a legislative act entitled to absolute immunity). 
85 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 241–42. 
86 See Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 950 (11th Cir. 
2003) (holding that absolute legislative immunity protects a governor’s act of 
signing a bill into law). 
87 Bagley, 646 F.3d at 391–98; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1932). 
88 See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55–56; Bagley, 646 F.3d at 391. 
89 See Bagley, 646 F.3d 378 (upholding the Governor’s elimination of a 
department position through his line-item veto); Torres-Rivera v. Calderon-Serra, 
412 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the Governor of Puerto Rico was 
protected by legislative immunity for signing a bill into law); Women’s Emergency 
Network, 323 F.3d at 950. 
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III. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY: A LESSER STANDARD? 
 
As legislative immunity is a creation of the judiciary, the states 
are free to develop independent doctrines via State Constitution, 
statute, or common law.90 While most states have adopted 
constitutional provisions that mirror the Speech or Debate Clause,91 
the effect of these provisions on federal claims against state officials 
remains unclear.92 The potential conflict between state and federal 
legislative immunity doctrines was revealed itself in Empress Casino, 
where the plaintiffs argued that the Illinois Constitution represents the 
sole source of legislative immunity in Illinois, and that this lesser form 
of immunity should govern federal claims brought against state 
officials.93  
 
A. The Illinois Constitution 
 
Legislative immunity in Illinois is derived from Article IV of the 
Illinois Constitution and certain provisions of the Illinois Code of 
Criminal Procedure.94 The language of Article 4, Section 12 of the 
Illinois Constitution clearly resembles that of the Speech and Debate 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
 
Except in cases of treason, felony or breach of peace, a 
member shall be privileged from arrest going to, during, and 
returning from sessions of the General Assembly. A member 
                                                 
90 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 
404 (1979). 
91 When Tenney was decided in 1951, forty-one of the then forty-eight states 
had specific provisions in their Constitutions insulating legislators from civil and 
criminal liability for legislative acts. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 n.5 
(1951). 
92 Infra pp. 17–19. 
93 Infra pp. 19–22. 
94 Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill.2d 286, 309–10 (2004). Legislative 
immunity in Illinois is actually derived from both the Illinois Constitution and the 
Illinois Code of Criminal procedure, Jorgensen, although only the Illinois 
Constitution is relevant to the RICO claim against Blagojevich. 
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shall not be held to answer before any other tribunal for any 
speech or debate, written or oral, in either house. These 
immunities shall apply to committee and legislative 
commission proceedings.95 
 
As with the Speech of Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the 
provision is limited to actual members of the Legislature.96 Also of 
note is the Illinois provision’s mention of committee and legislative 
commission proceedings, which offers greater specificity than the U.S. 
Constitution.97 Despite the similarities, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois—whether intentionally or not—indicated that the Illinois’ 
constitutional provision may preclude additional common law 
protections.98  
However, since most invocations of legislative immunity occur 
within the context of federal claims, the scope of legislative immunity 
in Illinois remains uncertain, as the state courts of Illinois have had 
few opportunities to develop, or at least articulate, an independent 
state doctrine.99 This is because until recently, the applicability of 
federal legislative immunity for federal claims was taken as a matter 
of course even in state court proceedings, and consequently, a 
definitive distinction between the state and federal doctrines never 
developed.100 However, the ambiguity of the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich forced the Seventh Circuit to 
reexamine the extent to which the Illinois Constitution precludes the 
additional protection of common law legislative immunity, as well as 
                                                 
95 ILL. CONST. (1970) art. IV, § 12. 
96 ILL. CONST. (1970) art. IV, §12. 
97 Id. 
98 Infra pp. 16–17 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in Empress 
Casino). 
99 See Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 531, reh’g en 
banc granted in part, opinion vacated on other grounds 649 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“…some states have little or no developed jurisprudence in [the area of legislative 
immunity]. State courts have imported federal common-law immunity doctrine into 
actions arising under state law.”). 
100 Cf. id. 
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the common practice of applying federal legislative immunity to 
federal claims against state officials.101 
 
B. The Impact of Jorgensen v. Blagojevich  
 
The Illinois Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in Jorgensen laid the 
groundwork for the arguable tension between the federal and Illinois 
legislative immunity doctrines addressed in Empress Casino.102 
Jorgensen involved a class action brought on behalf of Illinois judges 
against former Governor Blagojevich and the Comptroller.103 The 
Illinois Constitution prohibits any reduction of a judge’s salary during 
his term,104 and the Compensation Review Board, which the Illinois 
General Assembly created to determine the salaries of various 
government officials, established specific salaries for Illinois 
judges.105 The judges’ salaries included additional annual cost-of-
living adjustments (“COLAs”).106 Former Governor Blagojevich, 
realizing that he lacked the power under the Illinois Constitution to 
block the judges’ COLAs for the 2003 fiscal year from taking effect, 
instead opted to sign a reduction veto to the appropriations bill, which 
included the COLAs for that year.107 Blagojevich reduced the budget 
under “Personal Services: judges salaries” by an amount slightly 
greater than that which the COLAs would require, thereby indirectly 
eliminating them for the 2003 fiscal year.108 
The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the reduction veto as a 
violation of the Illinois Constitution and denied Blagojevich’s claim to 
                                                 
101 Infra pp. 18–21. 
102 Id. 
103 Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill.2d 286, 293 (2004). 
104 “Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished 
to take effect during their terms of office.  All salaries and such expenses as may be 
provided by law shall be paid by the State…” Id. (citing ILL. CONST. (1970), art. VI 
§ 14). 
105 Jorgensen at 287. 
106 Id. at 288–89. 
107 Id. at 291. 
108 Id. at 291. 
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legislative immunity.109 The Court held that the traditional doctrine of 
legislative immunity does not preclude judicial inquiry into the 
constitutionality of governmental conduct, even if within the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity.110 Since legislative immunity applies to 
both monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief,111 this seemingly 
innocuous assertion creates somewhat of a legal quagmire: How can 
the reversal of a Governor’s veto—a concededly legislative function—
be interpreted as anything other than an award of injunctive relief? 
As an additional complication, the majority in Jorgensen 
suggested the existence of a distinct Illinois legislative immunity 
doctrine when it stated:  
 
“As a preliminary matter, we note that most of the cases cited 
by the Governor were decided by federal courts, not the 
courts of Illinois. In Illinois, legislative immunity is 
addressed in article IV, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution 
and section 107-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 
Neither of those provisions is applicable to the Governor.”112  
 
Whether this dictum statement served as an affirmation of an 
independent Illinois legislative immunity doctrine or simply 
emphasized the nonbinding effect of federal precedent remains 
unclear.113 Whatever its implications, the ambiguity of Jorgensen was 
instrumental in prompting the reexamination of legislative immunity 





                                                 
109 Id. at 311 
110 Id. at 310. 
111 Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 278 (1990). 
112 Jorgensen, 211 Ill.2d at 309–10. 
113 Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 531 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
114 Infra pp. 18–21. 
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IV. EMPRESS CASINO CORP. V. BLAGOJEVICH 
 
A. Factual Background & Holding 
 
On May 26, 2006, former Governor Blagojevich signed the 2006 
Horse Racing Act into law, which required Illinois’s four highest-
earning riverboat casinos to pay three percent of their adjusted gross 
revenue into a segregated fund, the “Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund,” 
for a period of two years.115 The money deposited into the fund was to 
be disbursed directly to five Illinois horseracing tracks within ten days 
of the deposit.116 In support of the Racing Act, the Illinois General 
Assembly presented legislative findings detailing the decline of on-
track horse wagering since operations commenced on the riverboat 
casinos in 1992.117  The findings also touted several benefits to Illinois 
farmers, breeders, and horseracing fans.118 Former Governor 
Blagojevich signed the Act into law in 2006.119 
In 2008, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of 
Illinois filed a criminal complaint against Blagojevich alleging, among 
other things, that Blagojevich accepted payment as quid pro quo for 
signing the 2006 Racing Act into law.120 In light of the charges, the 
casinos filed another complaint in the Northern District of Illinois 
against Blagojevich and the racetracks as individual defendants, which 
contained two counts: (1) a federal claim conspiracy claim under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); and 
(2) a state-law claim against all five racetracks seeking a constructive 
trust to prevent their unjust enrichment from the proceeds of the 
racketeering scheme.121 The district court allowed the RICO-
                                                 





120 Id. at 525. 
121 Id. at 526. For the purposes of this article, only the RICO conspiracy count 
will be discussed. To state a RICO conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must allege: 1) that 
each defendant agreed to maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to 
participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 
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conspiracy count to stand, and denied Blagojevich’s claim of 
legislative immunity.122   
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Blagojevich was 
entitled to absolute legislative immunity with regard to the RICO-
conspiracy claim.123 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the Illinois Constitution embodies the sole source of legislative 
immunity in Illinois and that only state legislative immunity should 
control the outcome of federal claims brought against state officials.124 
According to the Court, neither the Illinois Constitution, nor the 
Jorgensen opinion, was sufficient to displace a common law privilege 
so deeply embedded in our nation’s history.125 
 
B. Judge Posner’s Dissent: A Reformulation of Legislative Immunity?  
 
Judge Posner’s dissent suggested that the legislative immunity 
doctrine of Illinois might possibly afford government officials less 
protection than that of the federal common law.126 Judge Posner 
conceded that “when a state actor is sued in federal court for violating 
a federal statute, whether he is immune from suit by virtue of his 
official status is a question of federal law, ordinarily federal common 
law.”127 Judge Posner also conceded that the reason for applying 
federal common law was to prevent State interference with Federal 
interests,128 and were state law to determine the scope of official 
immunity, nothing would stop the states from interfering with the 
enforcement of federal statutes such as RICO.129  
                                                                                                                   
and 2) that each defendant further agreed that someone would commit at least two 
predicate acts to accomplish those goals. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich 
(Empress I), 674 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2009) rev'd, 638 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
122 Empress Casino, 638. F.3d at 532. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 532–33. 
126 Id. at 543 (Posner, J., dissenting). 





Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 7, Issue 1                               Fall 2011 
 
However, Judge Posner also emphasized the irony of abrogating a 
state-law defense that further promotes the enforcement of federal law, 
musing, “[t]he interest in giving state officers immunity from suit is a 
state interest. If the state places no value on that interest in a particular 
setting…there is no reason for a federal court, enforcing a federal 
statute, to grant the state official immunity from suit.”130 Accordingly, 
Judge Posner entertained the possibility that Illinois legislative 
immunity—if distinct from the federal law—should be given 
controlling effect, as the displacement of state law by federal common 
law is limited to situations where there is a significant conflict 
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.131 As 
no such conflict exists between the Illinois and federal legislative 
immunity doctrines, the federal government has no significant interest 
in providing more protection to state officials than the laws of that 
state would allow.132 
According to Judge Posner, the ambiguity of Jorgensen was 
sufficient to draw the existing relationship between state and federal 
immunity doctrines into question, and that the Court should certify to 
the Illinois Supreme Court the issue of whether legislative immunity in 
Illinois permits a suit to go forward against a governor when the suit is 
based on the performance of a legislative act other than a veto for a 
criminal purpose.133  
 
V. ANALYSIS: LET THE STATES CLEAN UP THEIR OWN MESS 
 
A. The Illinois Constitution does not preclude additional protections  
at common law, whether at the state or federal level 
 
The plaintiff’s argument in Empress Casino that the Illinois 
Constitution represents the sole source of legislative immunity in 
Illinois is simply unfounded. Though perhaps in understated fashion, 
the majority was correct in suggesting that “[i]t is not at all clear that if 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 543. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 541–44. 
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presented with a proper claim of common-law legislative immunity, 
the Illinois Supreme Court would limit the immunity to members of 
the legislature.”134 The plain language of Article IV of the Illinois 
Constitution alone fails to support any such sweeping conclusion, 
which would effectively negate several hundred years of legal 
precedent and raise serious constitutional concerns in the process.135 
Article IV establishes a specific protection for State Legislators; but 
the absence of an explicit grant of more expansive protections in no 
way evinces the legislature’s intent to preclude additional protections 
at common law. “The maxim that the inclusion of something 
negatively implies the exclusion of everything else (expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius) is a dangerous master to follow in the construction 
of statutes.”136 The assumption that an omission by the legislature was 
deliberate depends largely upon the context.137 The plaintiffs’ 
argument rested on the proposition that the Illinois legislature, 
realizing the ubiquitous nature of legislative immunity at federal 
common law, would have referenced such immunity in the Illinois 
Constitution had it meant to confer those same benefits. But an 
equal—and far more plausible—explanation is that the Illinois 
legislature simply relied upon a well-established doctrine at common 
law, and felt it unnecessary to immortalize court precedent as 
constitutional right.138   
The resemblance of the Illinois constitutional provision to the 
Speech or Debate Clause probably demonstrates the Illinois 
Legislature’s intent either to model Illinois law after the federal 
legislative immunity doctrine, or otherwise incorporate the federal 
doctrine into Illinois law. In deciding to adopt a constitutional 
                                                 
134 Id. at 532 (majority opinion). 
135 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (“Let us assume, merely for 
the moment, that Congress has constitutional power to limit the freedom of State 
legislators acting within their traditional [legislative] sphere. That would be a big 
assumption.”). 
136 Custis v. Davis, 511 U.S. 485, 501 (1994) (internal quotation omitted). 
137 Id. at 502. 
138 Cf. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (discussing the unlikelihood that Congress 
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privilege with near identical language, the Illinois Legislature 
presumably had full knowledge of the relationship between the 
constitutional privilege and its corollary of legislative immunity at 
common law.139 A presumption so compelling should be rebuttable 
only upon clear and express language to the contrary, either by statute 
or constitutional amendment. Neither the text of the Illinois 
Constitution, nor the context within which it was drafted offers any 
such rebuttal.140 If the text of the Illinois Constitution is indicative of 
anything, it is the Illinois legislature’s intent to achieve the same 
cooperative balance in Illinois as exists at the federal level, without 
even the slightest notion that more expansive protections at common 
law might be precluded. Article IV of the Illinois Constitution merely 
provides the minimum protections to which legislators are entitled, 
leaving more generous protections to the discretion of the courts. 
Judge Posner’s dissent in Empress Casino also overestimates the 
uncertainty that resulted from the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in 
Jorgensen.141 Jorgensen simply stood for the proposition that, while 
legislative immunity typically precludes both monetary and injunctive 
relief, its protective scope may never extend so far as to preclude a 
facial challenge to the constitutionality a particular piece of 
legislation.142 In other words, the Governor’s veto in Jorgensen was 
reversed not because its effect was to violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights, but because the veto itself resulted in 
unconstitutional legislation.143 As Jorgensen acknowledged, the 
naming of a government official in a civil suit is hardly a novel 
occurrence when the constitutionality of the governmental action is at 
issue.144 Thus, Jorgensen does nothing to alter or lessen the degree of 
                                                 
139 Cf. id. at 378–89 (“As other state’s joined the Union or revised their 
Constitutions, they took great care to preserve the principle that the legislature must 
be free to speak and act without fear of criminal and civil liability.”). 
140 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
141 Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 541–44 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
142 See generally Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill.2d 286, 309–11 (2004). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 310 (“Examples of Illinois governors being joined as defendants in 
cases seeking declaratory injunctive relief based on alleged violations of state 
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protection available to Illinois officials from federal suit. To conclude 
otherwise would leave the courts powerless to overturn 
unconstitutional legislation, thereby stripping the judiciary of one of 
its primary functions.145 Though perhaps not in explicit terms, the 
courts have routinely recognized the distinction between injunctive 
relief as a remedy for individual harm, and as a means of invalidating 
unconstitutional legislation.146 Jorgensen simply reaffirmed what 
should seem obvious: that legislative immunity cannot operate to 
preclude judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of legislation. 
 
B. The Illinois Constitution lacks the requisite authority  
to preclude federal legislative immunity for federal claims. 
 
1. The Preemption Doctrine Does Not Apply 
 
The legal quandary that arose in Empress Casino was due in large 
part to the inapplicability of traditional preemption principles. The 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution allows for federal law to 
preempt state law if the court determines that there was congressional 
intent to do so, or if compliance with both federal and state law would 
be impossible.147 However, the circumstances in Empress Casino were 
unique in that a state-law defense that affords lesser protection than 
the federal defense does not necessarily create a conflict—at least in 
                                                                                                                   
constitutional and legal requirements are commonplace.”); see also Clinton v. New 
York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–41 (1998) (holding the President’s veto power under the 
Line-Item Veto Act unconstitutional). 
145 See id. at 310. 
146 See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (Of course, legislators 
are bound to respect the limits placed on their discretion by the Federal 
Constitution…and their laws will have no effect to the extent that courts believe 
them to be unconstitutional.”). 
147 Tipton v. Sec’y of Educ., 768 F. Supp. 540, 551 (S.D. W. Va. 1991). 
Congressional intent to preempt state law may be demonstrated by: 1) express 
preemption, where express terms in the statutory scheme demand the displacement 
of state law; 2) implied preemption, where intent may be inferred because the 
congressional regulation left no room for supplementary state regulation; and 3) 
conflict preemption, where congress has not entirely preempted state law, though 
federal law may still preempt state law to the extent that the two conflict. Id. 
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the traditional sense.148 As Judge Posner recognized in his dissent, a 
less favorable state-law defense in no way restricts the federal 
government’s ability to enforce federal law, but actually expands the 
scope of the substantive federal law.149 Thus, it would seem that 
preemption principles are inapplicable, as preemption typically refers 
to the federal law’s displacement of state law, not the other way 
around.150 Judge Posner seems to suggest that if no conflict exists, 
then federal preemption of state law is unnecessary 151 .  
                                                
Such a claim seems tenable at first glance, but it ultimately fails to 
persuade. Reduced to its essential components, the Posner argument 
suggests that the lesser state legislative immunity doctrine should not 
be preempted by federal legislative immunity because it creates no 
conflict with the federal law, but simultaneously argues that the 
nonexistence of any conflict warrants the preemption of federal 
legislative immunity by the state doctrine. This presupposes the 
federal legislative immunity doctrine’s interference with the laws of 
the state, which under the circumstances in Empress Casino could only 
mean the federal government’s interference with a state-law defense. 
Thus, the plaintiffs and Judge Posner seem to advocate some type of 
“reverse-preemption.”152 However, this argument falls short in several 
respects. First, reverse-preemption has been recognized only within 
the narrow context of insurance disputes, with explicit congressional 
authorization.153 Aside from the obvious fact that the claim against 
form Governor Blagojevich did not involve an insurance dispute, the 
Federal RICO statute upon which the civil claim against him was 
brought contains no congressional authorization for the displacement 
of federal law.154  
 
148 Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 543–44 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. 
150 Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
151 See Empress Casino, 638 F.3d at 544. 
152 See id. at 543–44. 
153 Riverview Health Inst., LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 514 (6th 
Cir. 2010). Reverse-preemption for insurance disputes is expressly provided for by 
the McCarren-Ferguson Act. 
154 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq. 
89 
25
Savin: Dysfunction Junction: Should the Courts Rethink the Functional Ap
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 7, Issue 1                               Fall 2011 
 
Second, preemption of any kind typically refers to a conflict 
between substantive, not procedural laws.155 Thus, to preclude federal 
legislative immunity as a defense, it would need somehow to conflict 
with some substantive law of the State.156 In the same way that a 
weakened state legislative immunity doctrine does not interfere with 
the substantive laws of the federal government, a more expansive 
federal legislative immunity doctrine does not interfere with the 
substantive laws of the state (at least where the claim is based on 
federal law). Federal legislative immunity simply affords greater 
protection from civil liability arising out of the laws of the federal 
government, which in no way infringes on the substantive laws of 
Illinois. If the plaintiffs in Empress Casino had relied upon, or 
otherwise incorporated substantive state law into the federal RICO-
conspiracy claim, perhaps the controlling effect of Illinois legislative 
immunity would have carried greater weight with the Seventh 
Circuit.157 However, where no such reliance or incorporation occurs, 
the defendant-state official may avail himself of any applicable federal 
defenses, including federal legislative immunity.158 
 
2. The Preclusion of Federal Legislative Immunity would unfairly 
prejudice the defendant state-official. 
 
In addition to the lack of legal support for the displacement of 
federal legislative immunity by the states, given the Seventh Circuit’s 
prior decisions in comparable cases, allowing such displacement for 
even state legislative immunity doctrines of lesser protective scope 
                                                                                                                   
 
155 United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1330–31 (7th Cir. 1988). 
156 Id. 
157 Id.; see also Young v. United States, 149 F.R.D. 199, 202 (S.D. Cal. 1993) 
(“Where state law operates of its own force, it is clear that state law supplies the rule 
of decision. However, when state law becomes, in effect, the federal law by 
incorporation, the federal law supplies the rule of decision.”). 
158 The incorporation of state-law defenses to federal claims could depend upon 
the particular statute that provides the substantive law. Cf. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 
1331 (holding that the federal RICO-conspiracy statute does not allow the 
incorporation of state-law defenses). 
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would have illogical and inequitable consequences. For example, in 
Hampton v. City of Chicago the Seventh Circuit held that conduct 
wrongful under § 1983 cannot be immunized by the Illinois Tort 
Immunity Act, which precludes civil liability for certain government 
officials under Illinois law.159 The court reasoned that the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution demands that federal legislative 
immunity control the outcome of federal claims, given the overriding 
importance of federal law.160 Accordingly, the defendant cannot 
invoke a state-law defense that offers greater protection than the 
federal law woul 161 d allow.  
                                                
Concededly, Hampton is distinguishable from Empress Casino, as 
the Illinois Tort Immunity Act afforded greater protection than the 
federal law in that particular case, which quite obviously would 
interfere with the enforcement of Federal law.162 But to allow the 
result sought by the plaintiffs in Empress Casino for state-law defense 
affords lesser protection would unfairly disadvantage the defendant-
state official. The combined effect of such a result and the holding in 
Hampton would produce the following rule: the plaintiff may rely on a 
federal claim to seek damages, but the defendant would be barred from 
invoking a perfectly valid federal defense to which he would normally 
be entitled. Why should the courts, or the states for that matter, 
endorse an arrangement that allows the plaintiff to benefit from federal 
law, but denies the defendant the same privilege? 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. Muskovsky 
would create similar problem.163 In Muskovsky, the Court expressly 
rejected the incorporation of state-law defenses for federal RICO-
conspiracy cases.164 The defendants appealed their criminal 
convictions under federal RICO-conspiracy charges related to 
prostitution, claiming that under Illinois law, the defendant cannot be 
prosecuted for both the substantive and inchoate elements of a 
 
159 Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973). 
160 Id. at 608. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 607. 
163 Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1330–31. 
164 Id. at 1330. 
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crime.165 The court disagreed, holding that since the RICO-conspiracy 
charge was based entirely on federal law, any state-law conspiracy 
defenses were inapplicable.166 Furthermore, the court clarified that 
even if the RICO-conspiracy charge was predicated upon the 
incorporation of state conspiracy laws, RICO was meant to incorporate 
only substantive, not procedural laws.167  
However, Muskovsky is also distinguishable from Empress Casino 
in that state-law defense at issue afforded greater protection than the 
federal defense.168 But like Hampton, the court’s decision in 
Muskovsky in combination with the result advocated by the plaintiffs 
and Judge Posner in Empress Casino would unjustly disadvantage the 
defendant-state official.169 The defendant would be prohibited from 
invoking the state-law defense when favorable to his case, but required 
to invoke the state-law defense if to his detriment. No extensive legal 
analysis is necessary to reveal the injustice of stacking-the-deck so 
heavily against the defendant—only an appeal to common sense.   
Finally, the state courts of Illinois have also routinely applied 
federal legislative immunity for federal claims.170 The state courts’ 
application of federal legislative immunity within the context of 
federal claims has only two possible explanations: either the Illinois 
courts have elected to define Illinois legislative immunity according to 
the federal standard; or the state courts have conceded that only 
federal legislative immunity is applicable to federal claims. In either 
case, Illinois courts have dispelled any notion that only the Illinois 
legislative immunity doctrine—if distinguishable from the federal 
doctrine at all—precludes additional protections at common law.  
 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1330–31. 
168 Id. at 1330. 
169 See generally Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, 638 F.3d 519, 
541–44 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
170 E.g., Redwood v. Lierman, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1088 (4th Dist. 2002) 
(examining whether various government officials should be afforded legislative 
immunity from a §1983 claim according to the standard at federal common law). 
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C. Public Policy favors the application of federal legislative immunity 
for federal claims. 
 
While the illegality of mandating weaker state immunity doctrines 
for federal claims without congressional authorization is clear, the 
states are nevertheless free to impose weaker doctrines for state-law 
claims against their own officials.171 Congress, too, could amend 
federal statutes such as RICO and § 1983 to provide for express 
statutory language requiring the courts to acquiesce to the legislative 
immunity doctrine of the states. As federal legislative immunity is a 
judicial creation, nothing about this arrangement would offend the 
Speech or Debate Clause or raise separation of powers concerns.172 
However, the wisdom of implementing such measures is another 
matter entirely. 
 
1. The States should not dilute common law legislative immunity,  
even for claims arising under state law. 
 
The deterrent effect of a weakened legislative immunity doctrine 
for local and state officials would be of only marginal value. Exposure 
to civil liability undoubtedly has a significant influence on behavior 
under certain circumstances. However, it would afford only slight 
benefit atop the extensive reprimands to which public officials are 
already subjected.173 As a penalty for malfeasance, governmental 
officials already bear the threat of voter disapproval, public shame, 
impeachment, and possible criminal liability. 
However, no punishment is of greater deterrent value than the 
possibility of imprisonment.  Despite the protections of both Speech or 
                                                 
171 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 
404 (1979). 
172 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 347 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (noting that 
congressional abrogation of common law legislative immunity would raise serious 
constitutional concerns). 
173 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982) (concluding that the 
threat of impeachment adequately offsets the cost of affording absolute immunity to 
the President); see Tenney, 347 U.S. at 378 (noting that the voters are ultimately 
responsible for discouraging legislative impropriety). 
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Debate Clause and common law legislative immunity, criminal 
prosecutions of government officials have been upheld in various 
contexts.174 In United States v. Brewster, the Supreme Court 
constructed a narrow interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause to 
allow for the criminal prosecution of a former U.S. Senator:  
 
Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve 
legislative independence, not supremacy. . . . The illegal 
conduct [in this case] is taking or agreeing to take money for 
a promise to act in a certain way. There is no need for the 
government to show that appellee fulfilled the alleged illegal 
bargain; acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, 
not performance of the illegal promise.175  
 
In other words, the criminal prosecution was allowed to proceed 
because the punishment was not for the legislative conduct itself, but 
for the acceptance of money in exchange for the performance of the 
legislative conduct.176 The Supreme Court’s willingness to allow 
criminal prosecutions of government officials poses a far greater threat 
to corrupt politicians than civil liability. The corrupt politician who 
remains undeterred by the prospect of imprisonment is unlikely to fear 
civil liability. Continued malfeasance in the face of such dire 
reprimands exhibits a public official without fear of consequence, or 
whose arrogance disallows the possibility of getting caught. In either 
case, the additional threat of civil liability is unlikely to preserve the 
integrity of public office, and return the government official to the 
straight and narrow. 
The threat of criminal prosecution is not only of greater deterrent 
value than civil liability, it is also less burdensome to the legislative 
process. Unlike civil suits initiated by private citizens, the reasonable 
discretion of the prosecutor serves as a filter for criminal prosecutions, 
limiting the potential burdens of trial to those actions the government 
                                                 
174 E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 529–30 (1972). 
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deems sufficiently credible.177 While the Speech or Debate Clause was 
drafted with a skeptical eye towards prosecutorial intimidation,178 the 
Supreme Court has reiterated time and again that legislative immunity 
is concerned primarily with exposure to civil liability.179 Thus, there is 
nothing inappropriate about relying on the Executive branch to 
prosecute only meritorious criminal allegations.  
Whatever the deterrent effect of civil liability, it must also be 
weighed against the cost to the public.180 We must remember that the 
purpose of legislative immunity is not to protect the government 
official, but to protect the public from the hindrance of his public 
duties.181 Holding public officials responsible for their actions and 
compensating those injured as a result is undoubtedly an important 
public interest. But allowing such misconduct to go unpunished in the 
civil courts is a cost we have accepted since the dawn of our legal 
system, and for good reason: A legislature comprised of those without 
courage to legislate will surely come at a greater price.182 
 
2. Neither Congress nor the courts should allow the state-law 
legislative immunity to control federal claims. 
 
Notwithstanding the detrimental effect that a weakened legislative 
immunity doctrine would have on our democratic system, Congress 
could nevertheless allow state legislative immunity doctrines to 
control the outcome of federal claims against state officials. The states 
are free to provide whatever degree of protection they deem 
appropriate for their own officials,183 and Congress could easily 
acquiesce to the wishes of the states by amending federal statutes such 
as § 1983 and RICO to provide for explicit language to that effect.  
                                                 
177 Id. at 520. 
178 Supra pp. 3–7. 
179 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
180 Id. at 807 
181 See generally Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–79 (1951). 
182 Id. 
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However, allowing state legislative immunity doctrines to control 
the outcome of federal claims—even against state officials—would 
indirectly force the federal government to expend valuable resources 
pursuing claims at behest of the states, to accomplish what are solely 
state interests. Just as the federal government has an interest in 
choosing what claims to pursue, it has a commensurate interest in 
choosing what claims it wishes not to pursue. Allowing state 
legislative immunity doctrines to supplant the federal common law 
would enable the states to piggyback their enforcement responsibilities 
onto the federal government. Even qualified immunity would fail to 
mitigate the time and money spent by the federal courts hearing claims 
Congress had no intention of pursuing.184 While a federal claim may 
be brought in state court if provided for by statute,185 there would be 
nothing to stop the defendant-government official from removing the 
case to the federal courts on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, this arrangement would disturb the uniformity that 
federal law typically seeks to achieve. The variance in state-law 
defenses would indirectly expand the scope of federal statutes in 
certain states. This would inevitably leave the state officials of certain 
states more susceptible to federal claims, despite the fact that the lesser 
state-law defense was presumably developed as a defense to state-law 
defenses; and thus without any consideration of its effect on federal 
claims. Thus, the states will have unwittingly exposed their 
government officials to civil claims through the operation of state law, 
which would effectively penalize certain states for exercising its 
constitutional right to state sovereignty. 
Finally, the states need not rely on federal statutes to preserve the 
integrity of those who hold public office within their borders. A state is 
free to pass any number of laws that mirror those enacted by Congress, 
as many states have elected to do.186 Allowing the states’ legislative 
                                                 
184 Supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the lesser degree of 
protection that qualified immunity provides and the greater frequency of claims that 
survive summary judgment). 
185 For example, §1983 allows for claims to be brought in state court. Cf., e.g., 
Redwood v. Lierman, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1088 (4th Dist. 2002). 
186 Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 404. 
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immunity doctrines to control the outcome of federal claims is simply 
unnecessary to protect what are solely state interests.187 Instead, 
perhaps a state intent on imposing more stringent penalties for 
governmental misconduct should consider passing legislation exposing 
government officials to civil liability. The legislature of that state 
should have no problem reaching the consensus necessary to pass such 
legislation if it truly embodies the will of the people. Additional 
penalties should be implemented through the proper democratic 
channels within state, not through a clever manipulation of state 
procedural law. Allowing the states to indirectly expand the 
substantive laws of the federal government is both inefficient, and a 
circumvention of the democratic process. 
The costs of a weakened legislative immunity doctrine to society are 
equally clear. Without some filter to separate the meritorious claims 
from the frivolous, the duties of governmental officials would be 
significantly hampered.188 The traditional procedural safeguards for 
weeding out frivolous claims are inadequate to defendants holding 
public office, who are undoubtedly the most susceptible to civil suit 
given their public status and the effect of their official actions on 
individual citizens. The burden of litigating the frivolous nature of 
these suits would be overwhelming, wasting the time and resources of 
both the official under attack and the courts,189 and the increased 
exposure to civil liability would do little to influence the conduct of 
governmental officials. Congress would be ill-advised to amend 
statutes such as § 1983 or RICO to direct the courts to apply state 






                                                 
187 “State interest” in this case refers to the state’s desire to hold their officials 
to a higher standard than that required by federal law. The federal government also 
has an interest enforcing its substantive laws. 
188 Supra pp. 4–7. 
189 Supra note 58. 
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Amid the pervasive governmental corruption of late,190 the 
fundamental importance of legislative immunity in safeguarding 
legislative independence may have been understandably obscured. But 
the admonitions of the Founders should resonate loudest when times 
are tough. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: “In times of political 
passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to 
legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for 
such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate 
reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.”191  
Allowing state-law legislative immunity to control federal claims 
would destroy a legal tradition spanning the entirety of our nation’s 
history.192 To expand the federal laws according to the dictates of state 
constitutions is to ignore the tripartite system of our democracy. The 
deterrent value of a weakened legislative immunity doctrine, whether 
at the state or federal level, would fail to justify the inevitable 
hindrance to the legislative process that would result. Government 
officials would still be entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, a plaintiff 
would still have great difficulty obtaining civil damages, yet 
government officials engaged in legislative activities would bear the 
significant burden of incessant litigation. 
                                                 
190 Supra note 1. 
191 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1959). 
192 Supra pp. 4–7. 
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